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of limited enforcement of contracts. Using a simple model, the author shows that limited enforcement induces enforcement constraints but does not induce default (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , who capture such constraint assuming that borrowers face constraints on the sales of assets). To induce default, another friction must coexist, such as incomplete markets. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) and Zame (1993) analyze this friction using a general equilibrium model. The authors approach the problem through the debtors' side, arguing that the degree of punishment of debtors in case of bankruptcy influences the amount of credit in the market. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) and Zame (1993) show that in the presence of incomplete markets, 5 assuming that certain contingencies cannot be written into contracts, the intermediate level of penalty that encourages some amount of bankruptcy provides a higher level of individual credit in the economy. Still in general equilibrium, but with complete contracting, Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria (2012) argue that stronger legal enforcement has ambiguous effect on credit, depending on the level of borrowers' wealth. The authors show empirically, using an experiment in India, that after the reform the long term borrowing increased for large borrowers and decreased for the smaller ones. Also, they observed an increase in interest rates for all borrowers.
Using the incomplete contracts setting, Gropp et al. (1997) and Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) introduce the analysis of bankruptcy law design. The first authors examine the effect 5 The standard debt contract (non-contingent repayment of principal plus interest) that is usually offered to individuals and small businesses makes the market incomplete, since there is no contract that is offered contingent on the successful states of nature.
of bankruptcy exemptions on supply and demand for credit, while the latter authors analyze whether state-contingent moratoria enhance economic efficiency.
The economic development literature has highlighted the relationship between financial development and economic development at the macroeconomic level (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine, 2004) . The literature on financial development showed how important the incentive to repay is for this development (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997 and Djankov et al., 2007; Araujo et al., 2012 and Coelho et al., 2012) . However, in credit markets there is a trade-off between the incentive to repay debts to reduce moral hazard and the need to protect borrowers from the bad state of nature, allowing them a fresh start.
In this paper we analyze how the level of punishment of debtors affects the personal credit market development. From a policymaker perspective, it is important to understand how the degree of debtor punishment matters for individuals' debt financing and the overall credit market. To address this topic, we use the personal bankruptcy exemptions to construct a proxy of debtor punishment in case of default and analyze its effect on the personal credit market. By looking at the changes in the degree of debtor punishment (across time and states), we investigate whether and how these changes are linked with the market development.
Empirically, we run a two-way fixed effects panel regression to estimate the relationship between debtor punishment and our measure of credit market development. We use equilibrium data of loans (aggregated) and information on bankruptcy exemption in each state over the period from 1992 to 1999. We find that the relationship between debtor 5 punishment and the size of the credit market is not always increasing. In states with low level of punishment, there is a moral hazard benefit in increasing the punishment, which results in expansion of the credit market. However, in states with high enough levels of punishment, the benefit of moral hazard reduction is outweighed by the cost of the debtor fear to face the bad state of nature, which makes an increase in punishment reduce the volume of credit. Thus, our results suggest that the punishment applied by bankruptcy legislation should be neither so harsh that it inhibits credit demand nor so lenient that it reduces credit supply.
Although personal bankruptcy deals directly with unsecured credit, it can also affect secured credit. For example, in lenient states debtors have incentive to borrow through unsecured loans in order to reduce secured debt, converting the non-dischargeable secured debt into unsecured debt, which is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Our results show that secured debt is related to punishment in the same way as unsecured debt. On the other hand, states with weaker punishment have lower access to credit also, but in this case due to supply-side factors. The limited access to unsecured credit reduces the possibility of using this type of loan to repay secured credit. Thus, we can expect similar results from the relation between debtor punishment and secured credit. The small business credit market presents similar results.
Our paper contributes to the literature that investigates regulation and personal credit. Barth, Gotur, Neela and Yezer (1986) studied the effects of government regulation on personal loans using statewide aggregated and disaggregated data. Hynes and Posner (2002) presented in a survey discussion about the effects of creditor laws on consumer lending. Focusing on restrictions, Villegas (1990) measured the cost and benefits of 6 restrictions on the actions of creditors. Dick and Lehnert (2010) found that bank deregulation improves the terms of credit and increases the lending productivity. Finally Coelho, De Mello and Funchal (2012) showed that regulation that allows the use of future income as collateral expands the personal credit market. Like these studies, our paper deals with the effects of laws and regulation on personal loans.
Our paper also adds to the literature on personal bankruptcy and credit market development. In the personal bankruptcy literature, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) , using cross-sectional data on bankruptcy exemptions, studied how exemptions affect the demand and supply of credit. Wang and White (2000) theoretically investigated a reform of the U.S.
personal bankruptcy law that combines Chapters 7 and 13 and solved a model for optimal bankruptcy exemption. Lin and White (2001) and Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) focused in the effects of bankruptcy exemptions on mortgage loans, finding diffuse results. While the latter authors argued that exemptions help secured creditors by making it easier for debtors to repay secured loans, the former showed that exemptions increase the chance of secured creditors' denying loans. Grant (2010) provided empirical evidence that bankruptcy exemptions act as partial insurance against income fluctuations. Han and Li (2011) studied the changes in the access to credit after bankruptcy filing. They showed that in this case, households have more limited access to unsecured loans and increased access to secured loans. Unlike these studies, in this paper we analyze the effects on demand and supply for credit in equilibrium, since exemptions affect both sides simultaneously. Also, we evidence how exemptions affect the credit market at the macro level.
Finally, concerning the studies on credit market development, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shileifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, henceforth LLSV) were the first to stress the important role of legal protection of creditors in supporting this market. Djankov et al. (2007) added to LLSV by introducing the effect of information on credit markets. Also in this line, Pagano (2000, 2002) , Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Sapienza (2002) showed the relevance of this factor in determining credit availability. Our contributions to this literature are mainly two: first, we bring new results on how punishment to debtors as a type of creditor protection relates to financial development; second, since we do not need to make use of a specific measure of creditor protection, our results are not subject to an arbitrary index that defines the toughness or the weakness of a law.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: section two describes the personal bankruptcy law and its potential incentives; section three presents the data; in section four we discuss the empirical approach and the results; and section five concludes.
-Personal Bankruptcy Law
The US Personal Bankruptcy Law has two separate procedures named Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13. If debtors file for bankruptcy, creditors must go to the court to collect using one of these two options chosen by the filed debtor. 6 Most personal debts are discharged when consumers file for bankruptcy, however mortgage and others secured debts are not discharged in bankruptcy, despite the procedure generally allows debtors to delay creditors from repossessing assets.
The main difference between these two procedures is that Chapter 7 requires assets to repay debt, while Chapter 13 requires future income to repay the debt. When debtors file under Because the debtor would have to give up $15,000 in assets if he filed under Chapter 7, he would be willing to pay no more than $15,000 (in present value) from future income if he filed under Chapter 13. As a result of this close relationship between both chapters, we ignore the distinction between them.
These features of the bankruptcy law allow debtors to pick the procedure that maximizes their gains. Since most debtors have few non-exempt assets, their gain was generally highest under Chapter 7, and around three-quarters of all bankruptcy filings were under Chapter 7. 9 Debtors with high assets could also gain from filling under Chapter 7 if they 7 Most states have several types of exemptions, like residence exemptions (homestead exemptions), personal property exemptions (like equity in cars, furniture, jewelry and cash) and wildcard exemptions (where the debtor chooses anything to be exempted until some fixed value). Usually, the homestead exemption is the largest and other exemptions are small. 8 See Barron and Staten (1997) . 9 See White (2007).
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convert their non-exempt assets to exempt before filing. For example, debtors might borrow on their credit cards or obtain new consumer loans in order to reduce secured credit. These transactions convert non-dischargeable secured debt into unsecured debt that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Or debtors might sell personal property that is in excess of the personal property exemption and use the proceeds to reduce their mortgage.
Finally, we should also consider that the personal bankruptcy law also apply to small business. The reason of why the personal bankruptcy law applies to small business and not just to individuals is because when a firm is noncorporate, its debts are personal liabilities of the owner, so that lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to the owner. If the firm fails, the owner can file for bankruptcy and his business and unsecured personal debts will be discharged. When a firm is a corporation or other limited liability entity, limited liability implies that the owners are not legally responsible for the firm's debts. However, lenders may require, and often do, that the owners guarantee loans with some personal assets (second mortgages for example). Thus, besides personal debts, personal bankruptcy law applies to noncorporate businesses and may also apply to small corporate businesses.
-Data Set
Our sample contains state specific data from 1992 to 1999. Small Business Loans less than $100,000 = amount of loans of $100,000 or less given by financial institutions to small businesses; Small Business Loans between $100,000 and $250,000 = amount of loans between $100,000 and $250,000 given by financial institutions to small businesses;
Small Business Loans between $250,000 and $1 Million = amount of loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000 given by financial institutions to small businesses.
We also collected statewide data on bankruptcy exemption. It was handpicked from Elias et al. (1993 Elias et al. ( , 1996 Elias et al. ( , 1999 Elias et al. ( , 2001 Elias et al. ( , 2002 Elias et al. ( , 2004 Elias et al. ( , 2005 Elias et al. ( and 2006 Based on the bankruptcy exemption information, we construct a debtor punishment variable. 16 We can define the debtor protection as the sum of homestead and personal property exemptions, that is, how much cannot be taken from the debtor in case of bankruptcy. Notice that this variable is inversely related to the penalty imposed on debtors in their state, because the higher (lower) the debtor exemption, the less (more) the creditor can seize of the debtors' assets. So this variable can be seen as the inverse of the debtor punishment. After normalizing the bankruptcy exemption by the whole period lowest level and calculating its inverse, the variable used as the debtors' penalty is a measure between 0 and 1 and is defined as the following:
Debtor Punishment 1 Normalized Exemption . Table 1 presents each variable description, source and the main descriptive statistics.
-Empirical Approach
To investigate the relationship between each measure of credit market development and debtor punishment, we regress the logarithm 17 of each measure of private credit market on a small share of the population. The debtors' punishment variable works to fulfill this feature.
17 Because the distribution of personal and small business loans are right-skewed, we use the natural logarithm To test our hypothesis, one possibility is to analyze whether differences in punishment levels across states affect the volume of credit. However, the pooled cross-section results are vulnerable to criticism because the punishment variables may be acting as proxies for non-bankruptcy variables at the state level which are omitted from the regression. The usual response to this problem has been to use panel data rather than single year cross-section data and to introduce both state and year fixed effects. Using panel data with fixed effects, the cross-section fixed effects will capture the effect of variation across states on the punishment levels, while the punishment variables themselves will capture only the effects of changes in the punishment level between 1992 and 1999. To capture the potential nonlinearity, first we split our sample into terciles: low, medium and high punishment. Then, we create three dummies that are equal to one if the firm-year observation belongs to the group and zero otherwise (d_L, d_M, and d_H represent the dummy for the group with lower, medium and higher level of punishment respectively). To get the specific effect of punishment for each group we interact the punishment variable and all the controls with each dummy, and using the two-side fixed effects panel regression, we have the following model:
where the differences between groups of the effect of punishment on credit market is directly given by the β estimator, and the total effect of punishment for each group is of personal loans as the dependent variable in our specification.
(1)
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given by the sum of parameters δ and .
β As an alternative model for this specification, we also ran a polynomial regression adding a second-order term for the punishment variable, as the following:
As a result, we expected to observe a positive value for 1 θ and a negative value for 2 θ , pointing to a concave relation between the punishment variable and the credit market. Table 2 reports the coefficient values from equations (1) and (2) (1), such change would produce for states with higher levels of punishment a reduction of approximately 6.13% and 1.87% in the unsecured and secured loans respectively, while its effect on states with lower levels of punishment would be a increase of 6.81% and 7.44% in the unsecured and secured loans. Model 2 regressions show that for both types of loans, the first coefficient is positive and the second is negative, pointing to a relationship that specifies a concave form. The optimal level of debtor punishment using the results in Table 2 varies from 0.24 (unsecured loans) to 0.32 (secured loans), in a measure between zero and one. Moreover, since the bankruptcy exemption is a function of debtor punishment, in monetary terms a personal bankruptcy law that exempts debts between $17,187 and $22,916 tends to maximize the development of the personal credit market. It is not optimal for the economy for punishment to be either sufficiently harsh or sufficiently lenient.
-Tests for Personal Loans
Note that as we claim, there is an intermediate level of debtors' punishment that maximizes 
Secured Credit Unsecured Credit
the level of personal credit in the economy. For higher levels of punishment (lower exemptions), the demand for credit is inhibited, since debtors fear the consequences of bankruptcy, producing an underdeveloped personal credit market. As the punishment declines, the demand for credit is encouraged due to the availability of a "new assets" with the option of no-repayment at a lower cost (bankruptcy cost), and although the terms offered by the lenders tend to worsen, the equilibrium level of credit will increase. As the punishment approaches zero, debtors' higher incentive to file for bankruptcy strategically and the lower expected recovery of creditors reduce (or even kill) the supply of credit.
Therefore, there is an intermediate level that is optimal for credit market development.
-Tests for Small Business Loans
The personal bankruptcy law may also apply to small businesses instead of just to individuals. The debts of unincorporated firms are personal liabilities of the owners, so that lending to the firm is legally equivalent to lending to the owner. In such case, if the firm fails, the owner can file for bankruptcy and his unsecured business and personal debts will be discharged. Thus, we can expect the same incentive structure behind this credit market and the same relationship with the debtor punishment variable. Table 3 shows the impact of debtor punishment on small business credit, following equations (1) and (2). As in the results for personal credit, we have a non-linear relationship between debtor punishment and the credit market development, always being positive for the lower levels of punishment ( 1 β δ + statistically significant and positive) and negative for the higher levels of punishment (δ negative and statistically significant).
To exemplify the effect that changes in debtor punishment has on the small business credit market, suppose again an increase of 1% in the level of punishment. According to the results of model (1), such change tends to reduce the amount of all three types of loans (-4.74%, -1.87% and -3.19% for loans less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $250,000
and between $250,000 and $1MM respectively) for states with higher levels of punishment, while the opposite effect is observed for states with lower levels of punishment (7.57%, 12.86% and 12.75% for loans in the same categories).
Results from Model 2 point to the same direction. For all regressions the first coefficient is positive and the second is negative, pointing to a relationship that specifies a concave form, as in personal loans case. The optimal level of debtor punishment using the results from model 2 in Table 3 varies from 0.25 (loans less than $100,00) to 0.35 (loans between $250,000 and $1MM), in a measure between zero and one. To be more convincing about this endogeneity, we followed the literature on endogenous policy evaluation and estimated a log-normal duration model to study whether the timing of changes in exemptions was systematically associated with observables. We ran a tobit regression of the log number of years until the first exemption change, such as real state GDP, unemployment rate, population, median income, house price index and the number of banks (all in logs). We also used the year fixed effect. The data are upper-censored at the number of years until the end of the sample. Table 4 shows that the time of exemption change was not systematically related to states' characteristics.
18 18 For technical details on the implementation of the duration model, see Kiefer (1988) .
We also tested the equality of pre-treatment trends following a procedure proposed by Banerjee et al. (2002) . In this procedure, we looked at whether the trend of credit variables is statistically different between the group of states that changed their exemption versus states that did not change exemptions. We ran regressions only for unsecured loans and secured loans (the personal loans is the sum of both secured and unsecured loans), using data from 1990 to 1993 (pre-treatment period), since we have no data for small business loans. The equality of pre-treatment secular trends would be rejected if the coefficient was significantly different from 0. 20 in any case.
-Conclusion
The recent debate stresses the relevancy of striking a balance between giving a fresh start when debtors default due to bad fortune and the incentives for them to repay debts.
The early literature on credit market development showed how important the incentive to repay is for this development. However, when dealing with credit markets, consideration must go to the trade-off between the incentive to repay the debt to reduce moral hazard and the need to protect borrowers from the bad state of nature, to allow a fresh-start.
To analyze this issue, we investigated empirically the effect of debtor punishment on the personal and small business credit market. We found a non-monotonic relationship between debtor punishment and credit market development. Moreover, there is an intermediate level of debtor punishment that maximizes the private credit for personal loans (unsecured and secured) and small business loans. This means that lower levels of debtor punishment (poorer creditor protection) provide an incentive for bankruptcy, which produces a negative effect on the supply of credit, since lenders' expected repayment is lower. On the other hand, higher levels of debtor punishment (higher creditor protection) impose very harsh penalties on debtors in case of bankruptcy, inhibiting their demand for credit due to the fear of bad states of nature. Therefore, the optimal punishment level is one that allows a fresh start for debtors and a significant recovery for lenders in case of bankruptcy. 
